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DUE TO AN
‘ENDURING ANXIETY’
OF NATIONAL
DISINTEGRATION, THERE
IS AN UNWILLINGNESS OF
ISLAMABAD’S POLITICAL
AND MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT TO
ALLOW ANY SUBSTANTIAL
REGIONAL AUTONOMY
slamabad is reaping all
the benefits, depriving
the locals from their
legitimate share’! In brief, this
popular statementamongcrit-
icsof thepoliticalplexusof the
country’s establishment sum-
marises much of the griev-
ances of the Baloch people
towards Pakistan’s national
government. But besides the
fact that this sentiment is in
line with the core rational of
conflictual relations between
the center and its obstinate
periphery, it only partially
reflects themultidimensional
and multi-layered conflict in
Balochistan today.
Doubtless, Balochistan is a
region of contradictory
extremes:With 43 per cent of
the country’s land-mass
Balochistan is the largest of
Pakistan’s four provinces
(besides Sindh, Punjab,
KhyberPakhtunkhwa/former
NWFP)but also the least pop-
ulated region (with around 6
million inhabitants , Baloch
only amount to 4 per cent of
the total population). It is
strategically well placed but
doesnot receive in-depthpri-
oritising within security cir-
cles. It is rich in energy and
mineral resources, but it is at
the same time Pakistan’s least
developed and industrialised
regionwith the lowest level of
literacy and incomewithover
80 per cent of the population
livingbeneath thepoverty line.
Beside the fact that there are
strongelementsof secularism
andanti-religious-extremism
as well as pro-Pakistan senti-
ments, it is the country’smost
troubled area finding its
expression in severe militant
responses towards Islamabad
combined with a remarkable
increase in violence against
non-Baloch, ethnic and reli-
gious minorities.
How have these antagonis-
tic trajectoriesdevelopedover
time? Did they only surface
due to theunfortunatehistor-
ical legacies or political mis-
guidance of the post-colonial
era, which was marked by
more than six decades of
unsuccessful, repressive poli-
cies leading to thesuppression
ofBalochaspirationsofauton-
omy?
Having this puzzle inmind,
the line of argumentation
made here is that the Baloch
conflict is a ‘logical response’
to the challenge of being a
marginalised subordinated
part inahighlycentralisedsys-
tem of governance, first
imposed by the British colo-
nial rule and later continued
by the Pakistani government
after a forced integration; not
only undermining their quest
for independencebutalso tak-
ing away the quasi-
autonomous status.Due toan
‘enduring anxiety’ of national
disintegration, there is an
unwillingness of Islamabad’s
political and military estab-
lishment to allow any sub-
stantial regional autonomy,
thusdepriving theBalochpeo-
ple of their legitimate rights.
Thegovernment in Islamabad
is worsening the situation by
depriving theprovinceofa fair
share of revenue distribution
natural resources.
Furthermore, the Punjabi
dominated national estab-
lishment also ousted the
Baloch from local decision-
making and implementation
processes by appointing
bureaucrats from Sindh and
Punjab to theprovincial insti-
tutions and authorities, espe-
cially the local security forces.
In addition Islamabad does
not shy away fromdismissing
‘inconvenient’ provincial gov-
ernments. Subsequently, the
electoral process has lost sig-
nificance for the Baloch as a
formof expressing their polit-
ical will. In brief, they treated
Balochistan like an internal
colony, the same strategy
which thePunjabi dominated
government applied to its for-
mer East-Pakistan wing until
it fought successfully for its
independence. Last but not
least, decisions regarding
Balochistan are made in a
frameworkofa tensecivil-mil-
itary relationship which does
not favour a sustainablepolit-
ical solution. In consequence,
Baloch (leaders) hadno share
in the existing state power
structure, forcing themto turn
towards an ‘own state entity’,
either through more autono-
myorby creatinganownsep-
arate state.
However, to be able to
understand this conundrum
one has to take the complex
and long history of the
Balochistan crisis into
account. As many separatist,
subnational andautonomous
tendencies in SouthAsia, also
Baloch nationalism can be
traced back to colonial times.
In consequence of the ‘Great
Game’ during the 19th centu-
ry, the largely autonomous
(Baloch)princely stateofKalat
was forcibly divided between
Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan.Additionally, the
part which remained in
Pakistan was absorbed by the
British Raj in 1884, an act
which was repeated by the
newly independent Pakistani
authorities. This chain of
events initiated a historical
legacywhich is still verymuch
alive today; it is henceno sur-
prise that this trajectory cur-
rently influencesPakistanipol-
itics. In this context onehas to
mention, that the then Khan
ofKalatNasiKhanwasable to
organise the Baloch in a
‘greater organised entity’ for
the first time. The core of this
‘quasi-state structure’ was a
military-administrativebased
allianceof a significantpart of
Baloch tribes inorder toestab-
lish a unified army. However,
despite the fact that itwasnot
really a nation state of the
Balochpeoplewitha fixedset-
up of a political-bureaucratic
framework, it gavebirth to the
ideational roots of Baloch
nationalism by giving a con-
crete, historical-institutional
point of reference.
By evaluating the historical
patterns of coercive force as
political instrument, it is not
surprising that the current
armed confrontations in
Balochistan are hardly a new
phenomenon. Post-colonial
Pakistanwitnessed four insur-
gencies: First, between 1947
and 1948, after the Khan of
Kalat declared independence
on August 15, 1947 and after
several months of war Kalat
was annexed forcefully by
Pakistan. Second, from 1958
to 1959, after the martial law
regime sent its troops into
Kalat in order to arrest the
Khan as well as to disarm the
tribesman, which inevitably
led to violent clashes and
unrest.Third, in1962-63, after
refuting the election results of
the then introduced systemof
‘Basic Democrats’ by the mil-
itary regime in Islamabad
which lead to several
upheavals like a left wing rev-
olutionary revolt knownas the
“Parari Movement”. Fourth,
between1973and1977where
the provincial government
were dismissed after being
accused of supporting anti-
Pakistan activities.
SubsequentlyBalochistanwas
put under governor’s rule,
meaningunderdirect control
of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, who at the time was
ruling inan increasingly auto-
cratic style.
This four year long conflict
led to the death of 55000
Baloch fighters, either involved
in randomlycoordinated trib-
al resistance groups or well
organised and trained units.
Currently one could also see
rising suspicion regarding for-
eign actors in Balochistan.
Now, a fifth insurgency is
under way in the form of a
moreor less‘low intensitycon-
flict’ which however carries
high potential to turn into a
large scale mass upheaval at
any time, like after a rape of a
female doctor in a hospital in
SuibyPakistani soldiers result-
ed in a major attack on the
nearby gas installations in
early 2005aswell as other vio-
lent incidents inotherparts of
the province.
Since then, the insurgency
which started already in 2004
ispickingupmore steamwith
each violent clash,worsening
thesecurity situationanddete-
riorating the socio-economic
conditions of all people living
in Balochistan. The robust
responseof thePakistan secu-
rity forces didnot only lead to
massive human rights viola-
tions (many observers are
claiming the existence of ‘kill
anddumpactivities’) but also
initiated yet another vicious
circle of accusations and vio-
lence, from both sides.
However, inorder tounder-
standwhyhistory is repeating
itself inPakistanandwhyelites
are unable or unwilling to
learn from thepast onehas to
take a closer look at
Islamabad’s political plexus.
One of the major problems
is that Pakistan presents itself
as a typical caseof failed civil-
ian supremacy and any form
of institutionalised civilian
control. Therefore, civilians
have to tread dangerous
waters inorder tobalancedif-
ferent interestsandpowerrela-
tions within the security-gov-
ernance nexus. On one side,
they try to weaken the army’s
grip on power in Pakistan, on
theother side inorder to keep
the internal security situation
under control, they have to
“eschew reliance with them”.
Butdue to incompetence and
corruption among civilian
institutionsandsubordinated
authorities, politicians and
bureaucrats continue to rely
on the army and (military)
intelligence inmaintaining law
and order. In consequence
theyare losingsignificantdeci-
sion-making power when it
comes to policy formulation
and implementation towards
Balochistan. Therefore, it
seems that civilians have not
much room to manoeuvre to
work towards a non-security
dominated approach.
However,withorwithoutcivil-
ian control it seems that there
is no remarkable difference
betweencivilians, the‘elected
representatives’ of the people
in Islamabad or the generals
in Rawalpindi in their
approach towards
Balochistan. Here one has to
state thatboth,politiciansand
soldiers, belong to the same
type of establishment which
is trapped inan‘enduringanx-
iety’, aphenomenonespecial-
ly significant, since it comes
alongwithanabsenceof long-
termstrategicvisions inallpol-
icy fields. Having the impres-
sion of being sandwiched by
arch enemy India and a hos-
tileAfghanistan, there is a ten-
dency to permanently evoke
a sense of suspiciousness,
heatedexaggeration, andcon-
spiratorial fantasies in the
areas of external defense and
internal security.Moreover, the
notion thatboth states are try-
ing ‘to slice the Pakistani pie’
establishedanextremelynar-
row and inflexible mind-set
when it comes to the incor-
poration of more rights, free-
domsandautonomy/self-gov-
ernance for the provinces in
general and Balochistan in
particular.
Subsequently, Pakistan
security circles are allergic
towards the adoption of fed-
eral elements into the politi-
cal-administrative system,
described as ‘fissiparous ten-
dencies’ (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto)
which were identified as
sources of instability and
essential challenges towards
nationalunityand integration.
Promisingmeasures likeRaza
Rabbani`s 18th Amendment
toPakistan’sConstitution, the
7th National Finance
CommissionAward (NFC), the
A g h a z - e - H a q o o q - e -
Balochistan package (or
‘Baluchistanconciliationpack-
age’) mark some important
effortsonpaperbut fail topro-
duce significant changes
towards worthwhile de cen-
tralisation in reality. This is
unfortunate since thepackage
was trying to deal with many
of the most pressing chal-
lengesof theBalochistancon-
flicts. Some of the ‘ignored
issues’ are giving priority and
controlovernatural resources,
broadcasting and telecasting
infrastructure to the provin-
cial government, starting a
sustainabledialogue forpeace
with the Baloch, and facilitat-
ing the return of exiled dis-
sents. Furthermore, the inves-
tigation of activities by
Pakistan’s security agencies,
particularly the role of the
paramilitary Frontier Corps
Baluchistan, the regularArmy
and intelligence services, the
‘missing’political activists and
target killings e.g. of key fig-
ures like Nawab Akbar Bugti
in August 2006, the most visi-
ble face of the current Baloch
resistance, who was not only
a Tumandar (tribal chief) of
the largest Baloch tribe, the
Bugti, but also a strong pro-
ponent of autonomy, or
NawabzadaBalachMarri, the
elusive commander of the
secretive, shadowyBalochistan
Liberation Amy (BLA), in
November 2007. Witnessing
numerousextrajudicial killings
by Islamabad’s law enforcing
agencies Baloch people are
starting to press very hard
towardsan immediate tracing
and release of political pris-
onersand/or‘missingpersons’.
Another importantdemand is
an increased participation of
Baloch people and the intro-
duction of a provincial con-
sent in decision-making
processes especially when it
comes to major development
processes in their province. In
this direction, oneof themost
debatable issues is the
Gwardar port project.
A case which not only
emphasizes the international
dimension of theBaluchistan
conflict but also the strong
Chinese influence inPakistan,
especially in troubled but
strategicallywell locatedareas
like Gwadar near the mouth
of the Straits of Hormuz. The
accusationof illegal allotment
of land in Gwadar by
Islamabad’s stakeholders is
just another example for
sidelining the Baloch in sig-
nificantdecisions concerning
their province. Furthermore,
a‘demilitarisationprocess’has
to be started which includes
the withdrawal of troops, the
stop of building new canton-
ments, and limiting the per-
formanceof theCoastGuards
to their primary duties, e.g.
only controlling the borders
under the Customs Acts.
In this context one must
state that the recently
announced‘reanimation’ and
intensified implementationof
theBalochistanpackageby the
end of 2013 remains highly
unlikely taking into account -
inaddition to the lackofmoti-
vation- the poor governance
performance of successive
regimes in developing the
country into account. In con-
sequence, the half-hearted
measuresof Islamabadarenot
only fruitlessbut furtheralien-
ate the Baloch.
Nevertheless, onemust also
state that the conflict has
become much more complex
over the years, especially due
to the increasing number of
actors involvednotonly inter-
national but also local ones.
Therefore, the conflict is not
anymore only about the cen-
tre andperiphery, Balochver-
sus Islamabad. It is also about
international rivalries, Baloch
versus non-Baloch living in
Balochistan, and last but not
least it involves conflicts
betweenBalochversusBaloch
divided through different
cleavages likeattitude towards
Islamabad, significance of
autonomy or separatism, use
of violence as a political tool
etc. As a result, theprospectof
any form of political solution
is becoming increasingly
remote. However, the estab-
lishment in Islamabad will
never accept a separation of
Balochistan. Observing the
imbalance of military capa-
bilities of the combatants
involved, there are no doubts
that Balochistan will remain
part ofPakistan.But as longas
Islamabad does not spend
moreefforts in findingapolit-
ical solution the armed con-
flict and the deterioration of
the security and socio-eco-
nomic situation will prevail
overa stabiliseddevelopment.
Subsequently,Balochistanwill
continue toposeamajor chal-
lenge for the stability of all
future national governments
and preserve the influence of
themilitary inpolitics.To sum
up,as longas there isnopeace
and respect for human rights
inBalochistan therewill beno
democracyworth thename in
Pakistan.
The writer is a lecturer of
Political Science and
International Relations as well
as a senior research fellow in
the Department of Political
Science, South Asia Institute,
Heidelberg University
DR. SIEGFRIED
O. WOLF
Want to
contribute?
at.independent
@gmail.com
BRISHTY AHMED
hat is love?Tomany
of us it is like the
first shower of
monsoon, filled with the
aromaof rawpassion, tooth-
ers it is more like the first
colours of spring after the
dark days of winter, but to
some others, the ones who
have borne the burnt of
unrequited love, it is more
like falling into abottomless
pit of darkness and despair.
But in the end, if you havn’t
experienced love, youare an
incomplete human being,
yet to experience the most
exotic emotion ever.
All these thoughts swirled
inmymindwhile reading two
of Andrew Marvell’s poems,
this lastweekends, amidst the
cacophony of the Eid cele-
brations. ToHisCoyMistress
and The Definition of Love
are twopoemsofMarvell that
I managed to escape with
during the Eid vacation this
time around.
Andrew Marvell was one
of the major metaphysical
poets andcontemporariesof
John Donne. In his, two love
poems To His Coy Mistress
and The Definition of Love
Marvell has very beautifully
expressed his contradictory
ideas of love. In To His Coy
Mistress, Marvell has
expressed his passionate
ideas about love and ironi-
cally in The Definition of
Love Marvell has highlight-
ed the negative aspects of
physical love and has sup-
ported spiritual love.
Marvell, inhispoemToHis
Coy Mistress has written
about the need for passion-
ate love in life, the lover inTo
His Coy Mistress appeal to
his beloved to relax her
Puritanical and shy attitude
and grant him the pleasure
of physical love. He pleas to
his beloved and support his
pleading with valid argu-
ments and reasons.
According to the lover, the
coyness and rigid attitudeof
thebelovedwouldhavebeen
justified if enough time and
space had been available. If
enough time and space
would have been available
then the lover could have
started to lovehisbelovedten
years before the judgment
and the beloved could have
collectedrubies sittingonthe
banksof theriverGangesand
the lover could have com-
plained about his discon-
tented love on the banks of
the riverHumber inEngland.
Then the lover in the
Petrarchan style started to
praise the beauty of his
beloved,
“An hundred years should
go topraise/ Thineeyes, and
thy forehead Gaze./ Two
hundred to adore each
breast: /But thirty thousand
to the rest.”
Then the lover tells his
beloved that after her death,
inside her grave worms will
attack her virginity and her
honor will turn to dust. The
poet then beseeches her to
give in to her lover’s pleas,
because the flame of desire
is also burning inside her.
Finally, the lover tells his
beloved that they should
consummate the pleasures
of life like “am’rous birds of
prey” and that if they cannot
control time theycanat least
fasten its pace.
On the other hand, inThe
Definition of Love, Marvell
haspresentedacontrarypic-
ture of passionate love. In
this poem, Marvell has
defined love as the by-prod-
uct of Despair and
Impossibility. According to
the poet, his love is of rare
birth and as a result, the
loverscannotmeetphysically
andmake love.The lovers as
per the poet are like the two
poles that are far apart from
each other and that can
never meet until some con-
vulsionoccurs and theearth
becomes flat.
The lovers are like twopar-
allel lines that can never
meet. Marvell here blames
the fate for theirphysicaldis-
tance.Thepoet says that fate
wouldnevermake the lovers
meetbecause fate, first of all,
is jealousof theperfect lovers
and secondly, a union
between the two lovers
would be a fatal blow to its
power and authority.
Finally, Marvell ends the
poem saying that because
the lovers cannotmeetphys-
ically they canbeunited at a
spiritual level because spiri-
tual love is achievable, as is
the consummation of spiri-
tual love.
Love is a paradox, at times
“full of sound and fury” and
atothers it ispoignantsilence
whispering the lulling lores
of passion in your ears,
enveloping your soul with a
joy that knows no bounds.
The great minds of human-
ityhave tried toreach itscrux,
but its truemeaning, almost
in tribute to the emotion
itself, remains just beyond
our grasp.
It is something that that
canbe felt andcherishedbut
at the same time it can con-
tinue to elude us. Here is to
love in all its nuances.
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